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Introduction 
In the last decades, lab experiments have become a widely accepted tool to 
investigate economic behaviour. The controlled conditions of lab experiments 
allow for measuring behaviour in great detail. This has led to the rejection of the 
descriptive accuracy of core models (such as expected utility theory) and 
assumptions (such as the selfishness assumption typically made in neoclassical 
analysis), but also to the formulation of new theories and a renewed interest in 
concepts which are difficult or impossible to measure with field data. 
The use of lab experiments has led to an increase in the popularity of 
nonparametric methods. Nonparametric methods are less powerful than 
parametric methods, which make them impractical to use with field data in many 
cases, but this is less of a problem if we can perform carefully designed 
experiments. Nonparametric models make no simplifying assumptions about 
functional form, an important advantage when we are interested in accurately 
measuring preferences. Parametric assumptions form a layer between behaviour 
we want to measure and the data that we have, where ideally we want to connect 
the data directly to the measured behaviour. 
One problem of nonparametric methods is that testing various forms of utility 
maximisation, which is equivalent to people having a consistent set of stable 
preferences, requires all data to be observed. To be precise, consider a choice 
problem where one can choose between some alternative 풙1 and 풙2 each 
consisting of different elements 푥1
푖 , . . . , 푥푘
푖 , 푖 = 1,2. We can interpret the elements 
푥1
푖 , . . . , 푥푘
푖  as different consumption goods in separate bundles of goods in a 
consumer context, or as different attributes of the alternatives, or as allocations 
of money between different people. If at least one of these elements is unobserved, 
e.g. we observe all consumer spending of some individual except for spending on
coffee, then we cannot test the utility maximisation hypothesis. This result was
first posited by Varian (1988, Journal of Economic Theory, 46(1)).
In chapter 1 of this thesis, a counterexample is presented against the proof of 
Varian’s result. The theorem is correct, however, and a new proof is provided. 
Furthermore, the importance of this result is demonstrated with an empirical 
application. 
The result presents a real problem because we typically do not observe all 
data. A dataset may, for example, contain data on grocery spending, but not on 
spending in restaurants. Even lab experiments suffer from this problem. 
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Consumption in the lab may influence consumption outside the lab and vice 
versa, but we do not observe consumption outside the lab. Consider a person who 
must make a choice from several bundles of goods to be consumed in the lab. 
This person may choose to buy a drink on campus after the experiment ends if 
they have chosen to consume crisps in the lab, whereas they may choose to buy 
a sandwich if they have chosen an apple in the lab. This means preferences over 
consumption in the lab and consumption outside the lab may not be separable. 
In chapter 2, conditions are derived under which the utility maximisation 
hypothesis can still be tested in experiments without an assumption of 
separability. 
In chapter 3 a new nonparametric method to measure changing preferences is 
introduced and an experimental test of this method is reported. One of the 
consequences of the greater empirical focus of economics is that it has become 
clear that social preferences play an important role in decision making (here, the 
term ‘social preferences’ is used in a loose sense, simply meaning that you do not 
only care about you gets yourself but also about what other people get, for 
whatever reason). As a consequence, behaviour is often different from that 
predicted based on an assumption of selfishness. Social preferences need to be 
incorporated in economic models.  
Some social preferences, such as a concern with fairness or altruism, can easily 
be modelled similarly to preferences over apples and bananas. The neoclassical 
model is defined over goods, but does not specify what ‘goods’ are, so one good 
may simply be the money the decision maker receives and the other good may 
money for some specific other individual. Reciprocity, however, is different. 
Reciprocal preferences imply preferences depend on what (the decision maker’s 
belief is) the other person’s intention is. That is, preferences change between 
different contexts in which decisions are made. 
Modelling changing preferences is difficult with nonparametric methods. With 
parametric assumptions, changing preferences can be captured with a change in 
parameters. Nonparametric methods do not have this structure; because 
preferences can be anything as long as they satisfy some elementary consistency 
properties, they cannot be neatly summarised in a small set of parameters. The 
method proposed in chapter 3 to model changing preferences is based on a simple 
axiom, called the Agreement axiom, which is introduced in the same chapter. It 
can be used in many different situations but here it is applied to reciprocal 
preferences, where one’s preferences depend on the kindness of the other person. 
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Suppose you can choose between different distributions of money for yourself and 
another person. The axiom then means that if you prefer some allocation 푥 over 
some allocation 푦 when the other person is unkind, even though you get less in 
allocation 푥 than in allocation 푦, then you should certainly prefer 푥 to 푦 in a 
context where the other player is kind. Because 푥 gives a lower monetary payoff 
to yourself, choosing 푥 must stem from some notion of fairness or altruism. This 
motive should be of even greater importance when the other person is kind, which 
means 푥 should then also be preferred to 푦. With the Agreement axiom, 
preferences in one context (when another person is kind) may be different from 
preferences in another context (when another person is unkind), but they are still 
informative about each other. 
Besides introducing a method based on the Agreement axiom, the results of 
an experimental test of this method are also presented in chapter 3. In the 
experiment, one subject could choose between two allocations, where one 
allocation gave a higher monetary payoff to a second player than the other 
allocation. The latter allocation may be seen as less kind than the former. This 
provides the context between which preferences of the second player may be 
expected to change. The second player made choices from budgets for both the 
eventuality that the first player chose the kinder allocation and the eventuality 
that the first player chose the less kind allocation. Importantly, subjects were 
informed that only the choice of the first player or one of the choices of the second 
player would be implemented (from the set that corresponded to the first player’s 
choice) so that the second player’s choice was only ever relevant as a response to 
the first player’s intention, never to a practically implemented choice by the first 
player. This allows for testing whether the kindness of the first player influences 
the preferences of the second player while avoiding income effects, and for testing 
whether preferences change in line with the Agreement axiom. 
The expanded measurement possibilities lab experiments provide have also led 
to a renewed interest in risk preferences that go beyond the traditional risk 
attitude of risk aversion. One example of these are higher order risk preferences. 
Prudence is one type of higher order risk preference. Where risk aversion is about 
whether or not you want to take risks, prudence is about in which situation you 
want to face a risk given that this risk is unavoidable. Suppose there are two 
states (these can be different periods of time or different outcomes of a random 
process), where wealth is lower in one state than in the other. Preferring to face 
the risk in a state where wealth is higher than where wealth is lower is called 
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prudence (the opposite attitude is called imprudence). Under expected utility it 
is equivalent to a (positive) sign on the third derivative of the utility function. 
Temperance is another type of higher order risk preference and is equivalent to a 
negative sign on the fourth derivative of the utility function under expected 
utility. This is a preference for combining or segregating risks: given that you 
have to face two independent risks, a preference for facing both risks in the same 
state is called intemperance, and preferring to face them in two separate states is 
called temperance. 
In chapter 4, an experiment is reported in which these higher order risk 
preferences were measured. Detailed empirical results from lab data in the past 
have shown measuring preferences is much more complicated than implied by 
traditional models. In the case of decision making under risk, the traditional 
model, expected utility theory, suggests that it does not matter whether outcomes 
are presented as gains or as losses. Measuring risk attitudes under expected utility 
is therefore not complicated by reference points relative to which outcomes are 
coded as gains or losses. In practice, however, it is well known that such coding 
of outcomes matters for risk preferences: people tend to be risk averse for gains, 
but they tend to be risk loving for losses. This is called the reflection effect. 
Model-free definitions of higher order risk preferences have been proposed, 
which means we do not have to rely on assuming expected utility when measuring 
these preferences. However, in many studies higher order risk preferences are 
measured without separating gains and losses, even though empirical results 
suggest risk preferences can be very different between the domain of gains and 
losses (as demonstrated by the reflection effect), and may be driven by loss 
aversion for lotteries that mix gains and losses. In an experiment reported in 
chapter 4, losses and gains are therefore separated to investigate whether this 
affects not only risk aversion but also people’s higher order risk attitudes. The 
greater proportion of risk loving attitudes typically found under losses should also 
allow us to test a hypothesis that a simple preference may underlie higher order 
risk preferences, which is that people like to combine ‘good’ outcomes with ‘bad’ 
outcomes. This hypothesis predicts that being temperate or intemperate is 
directly related to whether one is risk averse or risk loving, but that people are 
prudent regardless of whether they are risk averse or risk loving. This hypothesis 
tends to be difficult to test because of the few risk loving subjects observed for 
mixed or gain lotteries. 
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In chapter 5 an experiment is reported which investigates ambiguity and 
higher order risk preferences and how they relate to insurance choices. An 
important unsolved puzzle in the insurance literature is why take-up of long-term 
care insurance products is as low as it is. Long-term care insurance is different 
from most types of insurance in that its benefits are accrued only far away in the 
future, which makes its value inherently more risky and uncertain because the 
insurance may not perform (at least not to the extent expected by the decision 
maker). Recent theoretical predictions show that nonperformance risk decreases 
the value of insurance in ways that do not affect the risk-averse expected utility 
maximisers traditionally assumed in theoretical work. In particular, prudence and 
ambiguity aversion decrease demand for insurance with nonperformance risk. 
These predictions are tested. 
The final part of this thesis is a conclusion based on the findings reported in 
the four chapters. 
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Afriat in the lab
Joint with Jan Heufer
Abstract
Varian (1988) showed that the utility maximisation hypothesis cannot be
falsified when only a subset of goods is observed. We show that this result
does not hold under the assumptions that unobserved prices and expenditures
remain constant. These assumptions are naturally satisfied in laboratory
settings where the world outside the lab remains unchanged during the
experiment. Hence for so-called induced budget experiments the Generalised
Axiom of Revealed Preference is a necessary and sufficient condition for
utility maximisation in general, not just over lab goods. Lab experiments
are therefore a valid tool to put the utility maximisation hypothesis to the
test.
1 Introduction
In the past twenty years, laboratory experiments have become an important tool for
economists to test theories and elicit preferences. Induced budget experiments, in
which subjects are asked to make choices from budgets provided by the experimenter,
make particular use of the opportunity to collect data that is otherwise difficult to
come by.1 Such experiments have become increasingly popular.2
Choices on such budgets can be tested for consistency with the Generalised
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), which is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of a utility function that rationalises the observed choices (Afriat
1967; Varian 1982). Choices on budgets with many different prices collected under
clean laboratory conditions provide well-suited data for this test. Experiments
therefore seem to offer a unique opportunity to put the utility maximisation
hypothesis to the test as observing a violation of GARP falsifies the hypothesis.
1To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the term ‘induced budget experiment’ was introduced
by Banerjee and Murphy (2011) “[t]o contrast them from induced value experiments, i.e. those
in which demand and supply are determined by the experimenter and the object of interest is
the performance of an allocation mechanism” (p. 3864).
2Examples include Sippel (1997), Harbaugh and Krause (2000), Mattei (2000), Andreoni and
Miller (2002), Fe´vrier and Visser (2004), Fisman et al. (2007), Choi et al. (2007), Banerjee and
Murphy (2011), Dawes et al. (2011), Visser and Roelofs (2011), Bruyneel et al. (2012), Becker
et al. (2013), Burghart et al. (2013), Ahn et al. (2014), and Choi et al. (2014).
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However, testing a data set for consistency with GARP only characterises utility
maximisation when the demand for all available goods is observed. Varian (1988)
shows that if we only observe demand for a subset of goods, then GARP is no
longer necessary. In his conclusion, Varian (1988) calls his finding “a negative
result, similar in spirit to the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results” (p. 184) and
laments “[t]he sad fact” that unless the entire demand is observed, the utility
maximisation hypothesis imposes no restrictions on observable data. Based on
the same result, Cox (1997) argues that if only demand data on a subset of goods
is available, tests “cannot discriminate between inconsistencies with the utility
hypothesis and inconsistencies with weak separability” (p. 1055).
Clearly even the best laboratory experiments can only include a subset of the
set of goods available to subjects before, during, and after the experiment. It
therefore seems necessary to include the caveat that the analysis of experimental
data is only about a sub-utility function for goods in the lab. However, we will show
that this is not the case: Our theorem shows that consistency of the observed data
with GARP is still a necessary and sufficient condition for utility maximisation
over all (observed and unobserved) goods if unobserved prices and expenditure
remain constant. In particular, these conditions are naturally satisfied in the lab,
as the world outside the lab typically remains unchanged during the course of
an experiment. Thus, consistency with GARP of the choice set collected in the
lab or under similar conditions is still a necessary and sufficient condition for the
maximisation of a utility function over all goods, and the utility maximisation
hypothesis can be falsified using laboratory experiments.
2 Testing Utility Maximisation with Subsets of
Goods
Let Rk+ be the consumption space, where k ≥ 2 is the number of different goods. A
decision maker demands a bundle of goods xi ∈ Rk+ when facing the price vector
pi ∈ Rk++ such that expenditure equals pixi. We then say that (xi,pi) constitutes
one observation, although we will later assume that we do not necessarily observe
all parts of xi and pi. We assume that we have N observations, and the entire set
of observations is denoted by Ω = {(pi,xi)}Ni=1.
An observation xi is directly revealed preferred to x, written xi R0 x, if pixi ≥
pix. It is revealed preferred to x, written xi Rx, if xi R0 xa, xa R0 xb, . . ., xc R0 x;
in that case, R is called the transitive closure of R0. It is strictly directly revealed
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preferred to x, written xi P0 x, if pixi > pix. A utility function u : Rk+ → R
rationalises Ω if u(xi) ≥ u(x) whenever xi Rx. The set Ω satisfies the Generalised
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if xi Rxj implies
[
not xj P0 xi
]
for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . , N}. GARP completely characterises the utility maximisation hypothesis,
as Afriat’s Theorem shows.
Afriat’s Theorem (Afriat 1967, Diewert 1973, Varian 1982) The following
conditions are equivalent:
1. The set of observations Ω satisfies GARP.
2. There exists a non-satiated utility function that rationalises Ω.
3. There exists a continuous, monotonic, and concave utility function that
rationalises Ω.
However, Varian (1988) found that if demand for even just one good is not
observed, GARP loses all bite. To state this formally, let us partition the set of
goods and the set of prices into two sets each, with the first subsets consisting of
` ≥ 1 goods and prices, respectively, and the second subsets consisting of m ≥ 1
goods and prices, respectively, with ` + m = k. For the goods, let
yi = (yi1, . . . , y
i
`),
zi = (zi1, . . . , z
i
m),
xi = (yi1, . . . , y
i
`, z
i
1, . . . , z
i
m),
and for the prices, let
qi = (qi1, . . . , q
i
`),
ri = (ri1, . . . , r
i
m),
pi = (qi1, . . . , q
i
`, r
i
1, . . . , r
i
m).
From now on, yi and qi will be observed demand and prices, while zi and ri may
or may not be observed. Let ΩO = {(qi,yi)}Ni=1. We define GARP for ΩO similarly
to GARP for Ω.
Theorem 1 (Varian 1988) Suppose we observe ΩO and {ri}Ni=1 but not {zi}Ni=1.
Then we can always find {zi}Ni=1 such that Ω satisfies GARP regardless of whether
or not ΩO satisfies GARP.
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Varian’s (1988) proof of Theorem 1 was incomplete; in chapter 1 of this thesis
a new proof is provided. Note that Theorem 1, as well as Theorem 2 below, are
slightly more general versions of the ones stated by Varian (1988) who formulates
the results in terms of a single unobserved commodity (i.e., m = 1). The versions
here follow from simple extensions of Varian’s (1988) proof.
Suppose demand for all goods is observed but the prices for some of the goods
are unobserved. In that case, GARP only maintains its bite for subsets of the data
where demand is the same for all goods with unknown prices, as the next theorem
shows. This condition is very strong; it seems fairly implausible that a researcher
would observe demand without observing prices and that this demand remains
constant. In any case, researchers will typically not know in advance whether
demand will be constant and can therefore not rely on it.
Theorem 2 (Varian 1988) Suppose we observe ΩO and {zi}Ni=1 but not {ri}Ni=1.
For every subset I of indices {1, . . . , N} such that zi = zj for all i, j ∈ I,
{(pi,xi)}i∈I satisfies GARP if and only if {(qi,yi)}i∈I satisfies GARP. For every
J ⊆ {1, . . . , N} such that zi 6= zj for all i 6= j, i, j ∈ J , we can always find {ri}i∈J
such that {(pi,xi)}i∈J satisfies GARP regardless of whether or not {(qi,yi)}i∈J
satisfies GARP.
In what follows, we assume that unobserved prices and unobserved expenditure
are the same across observations, while allowing for unobserved demand to change.
Our theorem shows that these assumptions restore the power of GARP.
Theorem 3 Suppose we only observe ΩO, and that r
i = rj = r and r zi = r zj
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then Ω satisfies GARP if and only if ΩO satisfies GARP.
Proof of Theorem 3 Let R0y be the directly revealed preference relation on R`+×R`+
constructed using ΩO, that is, y
i R0y y
j if qiyi ≥ qiyj, and let Ry be the transitive
closure of R0y. Let P
0
y be the corresponding strictly directly revealed preference
relation, that is, yi P0y y
j if qiyi > qiyj. We have that xi R0 xj if
pixi ≥ pixj
⇔ qiyi + rzi ≥ qiyj + rzj,
and with rzi = rzj we obtain qiyi ≥ qiyj which is the condition for yi R0y yj . Thus,
xi R0 xj if and only if yi R0y y
j , and similarly, xi P0 xj if and only if yi P0y y
j . Then
a violation of GARP based on R and P0 (i.e., Ω violates GARP) implies a violation
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of GARP based on Ry and P
0
y (i.e., ΩO violates GARP) and vice versa. Thus,
[Ω violates GARP]⇔ [ΩO violates GARP].
Our assumptions on unobserved prices and expenditures are typically satisfied
in laboratory experiments. For all practical purposes, the world outside the lab
remains unchanged during the course of an experiment. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that prices for goods outside the lab remain constant. Furthermore,
even if subjects plan to buy different bundles of goods outside the lab depending
on which lab budget is implemented, their choices in the lab do not influence
unobserved expenditure outside the lab.
To have multiple observations we also need to assume that subjects choose
bundles from each budget separately instead of making one choice on an aggregated
budget. If subjects are expected utility maximisers, a random lottery incentive
mechanism guarantees this. Empirically, Hey and Lee (2005) found generally
reassuring evidence suggesting that subjects do indeed make each choice “as if it
were a separate question—in isolation from all the other questions in the experiment”
(p. 233).
Finally, note that if subjects can take money with them from the lab, we know
exactly how much it is and can therefore account for it. Ultimately, the crucial
point of Theorem 3 is not that expenditure on unobserved demand is constant, but
that the unobserved component is constant.
3 Conclusion
Much of the recent revitalisation of and increased interest in revealed preference
theory appears to be the consequence of the new tools offered by experimental eco-
nomics. Indeed, we find that there are good reasons to be optimistic about applying
revealed preference theory to experimental data. While it remains lamentable
that we can technically never falsify utility maximisation with typical household
demand data, the problem is ameliorated for experimental data. Laboratory ex-
periments are therefore a uniquely powerful tool to test the hypothesis of utility
maximisation.
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Conclusion 
In the chapters of this thesis a wide array of results have been presented on 
measuring preferences, from purely methodological to purely empirical results, as 
well as combinations of both. The main messages from each chapter are 
summarised and connected to each other in this conclusion. 
In chapter 1, a counterexample was presented against Varian’s (1988, Journal 
of Economic Theory, 46(1)) result which shows that we cannot test the utility 
maximisation hypothesis if the consumption of at least some goods is unobserved. 
A new proof was provided. In an empirical application, it was shown that testing 
the utility maximisation hypothesis on a dataset with unobserved goods results 
in incorrect conclusions both at the aggregate and at the individual level. 
In chapter 2, it was shown that as long as unobserved incomes and prices are 
constant between choices, testing for utility maximisation on only the data 
observed in the experiment is equivalent to testing for utility maximisation over 
both lab goods and goods available outside the lab. In typical experiments, 
subjects make several choices (only one of which is implemented) in a short space 
of time. The assumption that unobserved spending and prices do not change in 
the short time between these choices will typically hold. This is a different 
assumption from the usual one that everything outside the lab remains constant: 
it allows consumption after the experiment to depend on whichever choice in the 
experiment is implemented. Testing for utility maximisation based on lab data 
thus remains valid even if, for example, a subject plans to buy water outside the 
lab after consuming salted crisps in the lab, but to buy chewing gum outside the 
lab after eating a tuna sandwich. That is, testing for utility maximisation in 
experiments does not require an assumption of separability between lab 
consumption and consumption outside the lab, and is therefore valid in a very 
general sense. 
In chapter 3, a new axiom called the Agreement axiom was proposed and a 
nonparametric method based on it was introduced. It was applied to a social 
choice context, specifically to model reciprocal preferences. Existing models use 
specific functional form assumptions for simplicity, but these assumptions are 
unwarranted when one is interested specifically in measuring preferences. 
Furthermore, previous evidence in the literature on reciprocity did not test 
whether behaviour reflects a true preference. The evidence is based on testing 
whether average giving by a first player to a second player is higher when the 
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first player is given a low endowment by the second player or by a randomisation 
device. Measuring average differences has no power to reject the interpretation 
that a consistent set of preferences is behind these differences. The results of the 
experiment reported in chapter 3 indicate that people indeed have different 
preferences depending on whether the other player has been kind or (relatively) 
unkind to them, and that they largely act in accordance with the Agreement 
axiom. This is important, because allowing for different sets of social preferences 
depending on how kind the other player is perceived is much more general than 
requiring people to have only a stable set of social preferences. Because we can 
connect preferences from different contexts, we can learn something about 
preferences without having to measure them for all possible contexts. 
In chapter 4 it was shown that higher order risk preferences, like risk aversion, 
are different in the domain of gains and losses. People are risk averse, prudent 
and intemperate for gains, but risk loving (or risk neutral), imprudent and 
temperate for losses. When measuring these preferences it is therefore important 
to consider whether one wants to measure these preferences for gains, losses, or 
both, depending on the research question, as this will greatly influence the 
measured risk attitude. No evidence was found in support of the hypothesis that 
people prefer to combine good with bad: there were no significant correlations 
between risk averse choices and temperate choices, and the imprudence found for 
losses and the combination of risk aversion and intemperance for gains is direct 
evidence against the hypothesis. 
In chapter 5, several theoretical predictions were tested about how people 
respond to nonperformance risk in insurance. These theories predict that specific 
risk and ambiguity preferences, in particular risk prudence and ambiguity 
aversion, decrease demand for insurance with nonperformance risk, depending on 
whether the probability of the insurable risk and the nonperformance risk are 
known or unknown. The findings from the experiment support these predictions: 
risk prudence is negatively correlated with taking up insurance, and ambiguity of 
the insurable risk decreases demand for insurance. The ambiguous 
nonperformance risk associated with long-term care insurance may therefore be 
part of the reason why people underinsure  against long-term care risks. 
Science is an endless process of breaking down and building back up in a 
never-ending attempt to build something more robust. The results in this thesis 
show that some typical (implicit) assumptions are problematic, such as that 
coding outcomes as gains or losses does not matter when measuring higher order 
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risk preferences, or that social preferences only depend on final outcomes. But the 
results also go some way in dealing with these problems: we know how higher 
order risk preferences are different between the gain and loss domain, and how 
social preferences change depending on the context. Furthermore, a 
methodological result shows how we can measure preferences: lab experiments are 
valid to test the consistency of preferences even without assuming some form of 
separability of preferences over consumption in the  experiment and consumption 
before or after the experiment. 
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Samenvatting – Summary in Dutch 
Het gebruik van laboratoriumexperimenten is de afgelopen decennia steeds 
populairder geworden in economisch onderzoek. De gecontroleerde 
omstandigheden van laboratoriumexperimenten maken het mogelijk gedrag heel 
precies te meten. De resultaten van experimenten tonen aan dat menselijk gedrag 
veel complexer is dan werd aangenomen in economische theorie, maar de 
gedetailleerde resultaten van experimenten hebben ook geleid tot het formuleren 
van nieuwe theorieën en hernieuwde interesse in concepten die moeilijk te meten 
zijn met velddata. 
Een bekend resultaat is dat de nutsmaximalisatiehypothese niet kan worden 
getoetst als een deel van de consumptie niet wordt geobserveerd. Dit resultaat is 
voor het eerst aangedragen door Varian (1988, Journal of Economic Theory, 
46(1)). In hoofdstuk 1 van deze scriptie wordt een tegenvoorbeeld gepresenteerd 
tegen het originele bewijs van deze stelling. De stelling is desondanks correct, en 
in het hoofdstuk wordt ook een nieuw bewijs voorgesteld. In een empirische 
toepassing wordt het belang van deze stelling gedemonstreerd. 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden omstandigheden afgeleid waarbij data van 
laboratoriumexperimenten kan worden gebruikt om de nutsmaximalisatie-
hypothese te testen. Een complicerende factor hierbij is dat wat mensen kiezen in 
een experiment kan afhangen van wat ze voor het experiment hebben 
geconsumeerd of wat ze van plan zijn na het experiment te consumeren, en dat 
dit kan afhangen van welke keuze in het experiment precies wordt 
geïmplementeerd (meestal wordt in experimenten één keuze ook daadwerkelijk 
geïmplementeerd). De keuzes die buiten het lab worden gemaakt worden echter 
niet geobserveerd in het experiment, en zoals blijkt uit hoofdstuk 1 kan de 
nutsmaximalisatiehypothese niet worden getoetst als een deel van de consumptie 
niet wordt geobserveerd. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat onder specifieke voorwaarden 
de nutsmaximalisatiehypothese toch kan worden getoetst, en dat verwacht mag 
worden dat aan deze voorwaarden wordt voldaan in laboratoriumexperimenten. 
Experimenten zijn dus valide om de nutsmaximalisatiehypothese mee te testen. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een niet-parametrische methode geïntroduceerd om 
veranderende voorkeuren te meten. Met niet-parametrische methodes is het lastig 
om veranderende voorkeuren te modelleren; anders dan bij parametrische 
methodes is er geen beperkt aantal parameters die gedrag representeren en 
veranderen als voorkeuren dat doen. De methode die wordt voorgesteld in 
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hoofdstuk 3 is gebaseerd op een nieuw axioma wat in hetzelfde hoofdstuk wordt 
geïntroduceerd, die het Overeenstemmingsaxioma wordt genoemd. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt de methode toegepast op sociale voorkeuren, specifiek op 
wederkerige voorkeuren. Deze voorkeuren hangen af van wat iemand denkt dat 
de intenties van iemand anders zijn. Met wederkerige voorkeuren veranderen de 
sociale voorkeuren tussen verschillende situaties. Stel dat je de keuze hebt om 
geld te verdelen tussen jezelf en iemand anders. In deze context betekent het 
Overeenstemmingsaxioma dat als je een allocatie 푥 prefereert boven een allocatie 
푦 als de ander onaardig is tegen jou, ondanks dat je minder krijgt in allocatie 푥
dan in allocatie 푦, dat je dan zeker 푥 moet prefereren boven 푦 als de ander aardig
is tegen jou. Omdat het egoïstische motief suggereert te kiezen voor 푦, moet de
voorkeur voor 푥 boven 푦 als de ander onaardig is stammen uit een zekere waarde
die je hecht aan eerlijkheid, of uit altruïsme. Deze motieven moeten echter een
nog sterkere rol spelen als de ander aardig is, dus zou je in dat geval ook 푥 moeten
verkiezen boven 푦. De voorkeuren tussen deze twee situaties stemmen dus overeen
op een specifieke manier.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt ook een experiment gerapporteerd om wederkerige 
voorkeuren te testen. Hierbij wordt de methode gebaseerd op het Overeenstem-
mingsaxioma toegepast. De bevindingen zijn dat voorkeuren inderdaad verschillen 
afhankelijk van of een andere persoon aardig of (relatief) onaardig gedrag 
vertoont. Belangrijker, deze verschillen kunnen worden gemodelleerd met het 
Overeenstemmingsaxioma. De voorkeuren in de ene situatie zijn dus informatief 
voor voorkeuren in de andere situatie. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een experiment gerapporteerd waarin risicovoorkeuren 
van een hogere orde worden gemeten. Voorzichtigheid (in het Engels: prudence) 
is zo’n risicovoorkeur van een hogere orde. Waar risicoaversie de voorkeur betreft 
om juist wel of juist niet risico’s te nemen, gaat voorzichtigheid over de situatie 
waarin je het liefst een risico loopt gegeven dat deze onvermijdelijk is. Stel dat er 
twee situaties zijn (bijvoorbeeld verschillende tijdsmomenten, of uitkomsten van 
een stochastisch proces), waarbij het vermogen lager is in de ene situatie dan in 
de andere. Voorzichtigheid betekent dan dat je liever het risico loopt in de situatie 
waarin je vermogen hoger is dan in de situatie waarin je vermogen lager is. Een 
andere risicovoorkeur is gematigdheid (in het Engels: temperance). Dit betreft de 
voorkeur om risico’s te verspreiden over verschillende situaties in plaats van alle 
risico’s in één situatie te combineren. 
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Gedetailleerde resultaten van eerdere experimenten hebben aangetoond dat 
het meten van risicovoorkeuren veel ingewikkelder is dan geïmpliceerd wordt door 
het traditionele model van risicovoorkeuren, verwachtenutsmaximalisatie. Dit 
model suggereert dat het niet uitmaakt of uitkomsten worden gepresenteerd als 
winsten of verliezen. In de praktijk blijkt dit echter een grote invloed te hebben 
op de gemeten risicovoorkeuren: mensen hebben de neiging risicoavers te zijn voor 
winsten, maar risicozoekend voor verliezen. In veel onderzoeken waarin 
risicovoorkeuren van een hogere orde worden gemeten worden winsten en 
verliezen echter niet uit elkaar gehouden. In het experiment gepresenteerd in 
hoofdstuk 4 wordt dit wel gedaan, en het blijkt dat de risicovoorkeuren van een 
hogere orde verschillen tussen winsten en verliezen: mensen zijn voorzichtig en 
ongematigd voor winsten, en onvoorzichtig en gematigd voor verliezen. 
Het grotere aantal proefpersonen met risicozoekende voorkeuren voor verliezen 
maakt het ook mogelijk de hypothese te toetsen dat mensen een voorkeur hebben 
voor het combineren van ‘goed’ met ‘slecht’. Deze hypothese kan verklaren 
waarom mensen de soms vrij complexe ogende risicovoorkeuren van een hogere 
orde hebben. De hypothese leidt tot de specifieke voorspelling dat mensen die 
risicoavers zijn gematigd zijn, en dat zij die risicozoekend zijn ongematigd zijn, 
maar dat iedereen voorzichtig is. De onvoorzichtigheid gevonden voor verliezen 
in het experiment in hoofdstuk 4, en de combinatie van risicozoekende voorkeuren 
en gematigde voorkeuren voor verliezen, en de combinatie van risicoaverse 
voorkeuren met ongematigde voorkeuren voor winsten vormen bewijs tegen deze 
hypothese. 
Tot slot wordt er in hoofdstuk 5 een experiment gerapporteerd waarin risico- 
en ambiguïteitsvoorkeuren worden gemeten. Een belangrijk onopgelost vraagstuk 
in de verzekeringsliteratuur is waarom de vraag naar langdurigezorgverzekeringen 
zo laag is. Dergelijke verzekeringen verschillen van de meeste vormen van 
verzekeren in dat de voordelen hiervan pas ver in de toekomst worden 
verwezenlijkt, wat de waarde van dergelijke verzekeringen inherent meer risicovol 
en ambigu maakt omdat de verzekering mogelijk niet naar verwachting de 
verplichtingen zal nakomen. Recente theoretische resultaten laten zien dat 
dergelijk niet-nakomingsrisico de aantrekkelijkheid van verzekeringen kan 
verlagen op manieren die de risicoaverse verwachtenutsmaximaliseerders die 
traditioneel worden aangenomen in theoretisch onderzoek niet beïnvloeden. 
Wetenschap is een eindeloos proces van afbreken en opnieuw opbouwen in een 
poging meer robuuste modellen te bouwen. De resultaten in dit proefschrift laten 
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zien dat het meten van voorkeuren ingewikkelder is dan gedacht, omdat 
veelgemaakte (impliciete) aannames problematisch blijken te zijn, zoals dat het 
presenteren van uitkomsten als winsten of verliezen niet uitmaakt, of dat sociale 
voorkeuren alleen afhangen van de uiteindelijke (absolute) financiële uitkomsten. 
De resultaten in dit proefschrift bieden ook aanknopingspunten om met deze 
problemen om te gaan: we weten nu hoe risicovoorkeuren van een hogere orde 
verschillen tussen winsten en verliezen, en hoe sociale voorkeuren veranderen 
afhankelijk van wat de intenties van een ander zijn. Tot slot laat een 
methodologisch resultaat zien hoe we voorkeuren kunnen testen: 
laboratoriumexperimenten zijn valide om de consistentie van voorkeuren te 
testen, zelfs als deze samenhangen met ongeobserveerde keuzes buiten het 
laboratorium.
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